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BIG BROTHER GETS A MAKEOVER: BEHAVIORAL
TARGETING AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
ABSTRACT
A staggering 239 million Americans have access to the Internet and spend,
on average, sixty hours each month online, visiting some 2646 websites. What
few Internet users realize is that, during the time they surf the Web, they are
subjected to constant surveillance by potentially hundreds of different private
companies. These companies, called advertising networks, track Internet users
across the Web, collecting all sorts of personal information about them—their
gender, age, income, location, medical concerns, sexual orientation, political
affiliations, and music preferences, among many other things. Advertising
networks then use this information to deliver highly personalized online
advertisements to Internet users, a process known as behavioral targeting.
But advertising networks can use the information they collect for purposes
beyond behavioral targeting. In addition to exploiting Internet users’
information to deliver targeted advertisements, ad networks sell the
information to third parties, which could include, perhaps surprisingly, the
government. Armed with detailed records about Internet users and their online
activities, the government has unprecedented access to the most intimate
details of peoples’ lives. What seems such a gross invasion of privacy can
occur despite the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. The Fourth Amendment likely does
not apply to information gathered for behavioral targeting because of what is
known as the “third-party doctrine.” Under the third-party doctrine, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect any information a person volunteers to a
third party, because that person presumptively has assumed the risk that the
third party will reveal the information to the government.
This Comment explores why the third-party doctrine would apply in the
context of behavioral targeting, resulting in an unprecedented threat to
Americans’ privacy. Arguing that the Supreme Court’s justification for the
doctrine is inherently flawed, this Comment sets forth a new way of
conceptualizing the third-party doctrine and a corresponding analytical
framework called the “competing-interests test.” The competing-interests test
ultimately seeks to reconcile the conceptual difficulties that arise when
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applying the doctrine not only within the context of behavioral targeting but in
all situations in which a third party holds information about another person.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Brandeis once predicted that, in the future, “[w]ays may . . . be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose . . . the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances
in . . . sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions.”1 Justice Brandeis’s warning, from his famous dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States,2 perhaps seemed far-fetched in 1928
when it was published. Eighty-four years later, however, the Justice’s
prediction has proven startlingly insightful, if not frighteningly accurate.
Indeed, true to Justice Brandeis’s vision, in the last decade the government has
developed a powerful tool for not only exploring but also exploiting peoples’
“unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.” That tool is the Internet—or,

1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2 277 U.S. 438.
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more precisely, the capacity to indirectly track individuals on the Internet
through private companies that conduct “behavioral targeting.”
Behavioral targeting is an online advertising technique designed to deliver
specific, targeted advertisements to Internet users based on their perceived
interests. Companies that conduct behavioral targeting, known as advertising
networks, are able to predict Internet users’ interests by using sophisticated
technology that tracks and gathers information about users’ online activity.3
The resulting targeted ads are approximately twice as effective as—and,
therefore, much more valuable than—other forms of online advertisements.4
As a result, online content providers can fund their entire operations with
revenues from selling online advertising space, making it possible for websites
to offer online content for an unbeatable price—for free.
Over the last decade, behavioral targeting has proven increasingly
important, if not essential, as a means of supporting free content on the
Internet. According to industry experts, targeted ads “significantly enhanc[e]
the advertising revenue engine driving the growth of the Internet”5 and are a
critical component of “the economic model supporting free online content and
services for consumers.”6 But describing behavioral-targeting-supported online
content as “free” is somewhat misleading. Online content is “free” only in
monetary terms; with respect to privacy, however, behavioral targeting exacts
a hefty price. Behavioral targeting requires that ad networks collect and retain
immense amounts of data about Internet users. Moreover, under current law,
ad networks essentially enjoy unmitigated leeway to use the information they
collect for whatever other purposes they wish. In addition to using Internet
users’ information for targeted ads, ad networks trade and sell information to
third parties,7 which could include the government. Thus, unbeknownst to the
millions of people who regularly surf the Internet, their personal information

3 See TRUEFFECT, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2
(2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladprinciples/080411trueffect.pdf (describing
the Internet as one big “ad delivery mechanism”).
4 Howard Beales, The Value of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE 3, http://
www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
5 Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More than Twice as
Valuable, Twice as Effective as Non-Targeted Online Ads (Mar. 24, 2010) (quoting Howard Beales, former
Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_
Beales_Release.pdf.
6 Id. (quoting Charles Curran, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative).
7 See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W1.
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has been put on sale for the government to buy up and then use to monitor their
online activity.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Fourth Amendment—the bulwark of
constitutional privacy—likely offers little to no protection because of what is
known as the “third-party doctrine.” Under the third-party doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment does not protect a person’s privacy in information she has
volunteered to a third party.8 Likely falling within this definition is information
collected by advertising networks for behavioral targeting.
This Comment explores the privacy implications of the Fourth Amendment
third-party doctrine within the context of behavioral targeting. Part I provides a
brief explanation of how behavioral targeting works and why it plays such an
important role on the Internet. Part II offers an overview of the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to government searches,
including the development of the third-party doctrine, and explores the primary
criticisms of the doctrine. It then goes on to explain how the third-party
doctrine might apply to ad-network databases, noting that a paradoxical
problem would arise if ad networks were forced to obtain Internet users’
consent to conduct behavioral targeting: while Internet users would gain some
degree of privacy if they were given notice and an opportunity to opt out of
tracking, those users who chose to remain opted in to access free online
content would relinquish their privacy to the government because the thirdparty doctrine, at least under its current formulation, would inevitably apply.
Part III presents a critical analysis of the Court’s third-party doctrine, arguing
that the problem stems both from a common misconception of Fourth
Amendment privacy (as strictly “informational”) and from a limited perception
of the justification for the third-party doctrine. The Comment then offers a new
analytical framework for the third-party doctrine, called the “competinginterests test,” that incorporates these two considerations. Under this newly
conceptualized third-party doctrine, Internet users would retain Fourth
Amendment protections even if they consented to behavioral targeting.

8

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
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I. BEHAVIORAL TARGETING AND THE INTERNET
A. How Behavioral Targeting Works
Online behavioral targeting involves four key players: (1) the Internet user;
(2) the content provider, the website that provides online content and displays
an advertisement to the Internet user; (3) the advertiser, the company seeking
to advertise its product;9 and, finally, (4) the ad network, the company that acts
as a middleman to the advertisers and content providers. The ad network is
responsible for tracking and profiling the Internet user, and then placing the
advertiser’s ad on the content provider’s website when the website is visited by
an interested user.10
The ad network gauges an Internet user’s interest in any given product by
collecting and analyzing data about the user from three different sources. First,
the ad network collects information from individual content providers about an
Internet user’s particular activity on any given website.11 Second, the ad
network gathers information provided by multiple content providers, called
“clickstream” data, which reflects an Internet user’s activity across the Web.12
Finally, the ad network supplements the information it gathers with data about
any given individual it obtains from third-party commercial databases.13
First, an ad network can gather information from a content provider that
reveals a user’s specific activity on the content provider’s website.14
Technically speaking, this occurs in one of two ways. When a website
connects to a user’s computer, it can attach the user’s information to a
command.15 The user’s browser then sends the command to an ad network
requesting an appropriate advertisement based on the attached information.16
Alternatively, the content provider might simply send the information to the ad
9 Targeted ads are also used to promote political candidates. See David Herbert, Candidates Walk Thin
Line with Targeted Web Ads, NAT’L J. (Jan. 10, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/
candidates-walk-thin-line-with-targeted-web-ads-20081001?mrefid=site_search (discussing how the Obama
and McCain 2008 presidential campaigns exploited behavioral targeting).
10 See Behavioral Advertising Across Multiple Sites, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.cdt.org/content/behavioral-advertising-across-multiple-sites [hereinafter Behavioral Advertising].
11 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 2–3 (June 18, 2009),
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_felten.pdf.
12 See id. at 3–4.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id.
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network directly.17 The information sent to the ad network can represent the
Internet user’s activity on the website at any given moment or over a period of
time, and can include any personally identifiable information the user discloses
to the website when, for instance, she signs up for a service or completes a
survey.18
Depending on the user’s activity and the nature of the website, an ad
network may be able to paint a fairly detailed portrait of a user based on this
information alone. For example, if an Internet user is browsing through an
online women’s magazine, the ad network might learn that she is female,
somewhere between ages twenty and thirty-five, and interested in fashion. But
the information could be much more specific. For example, if the user accesses
articles about depression and dieting, the ad network might note that she is
depressed and wants to lose weight. If the Internet user signs up for the
magazine’s online sweepstakes, the ad network might then know her real
name, phone number, and e-mail and home addresses. Thus, if the user is
reading an article about weight loss on the website, the ad network might
display any number of targeted ads based on her activity on that website alone:
an ad for workout clothes based on a page she is currently viewing, an ad for a
depression medication based on her past activity on the website,19 or an ad for
a nearby business based on location information she provided.20
Second, an ad network can gather data about an Internet user by tracking
her online activity across multiple websites.21 This information is known as
clickstream data.22 To collect clickstream data, the ad network sends a
“cookie”23 to the user’s browser when she visits a website, which the user’s
17

Id.
See id. at 2–3.
19 Or, if the ad network is particularly cruel, it might display an ad for cheesecake, believing that dieters
are more susceptible to focusing on their cravings. Stephen Henderson is concerned that an evil ad network
might send depressed users advertisements for books about how to commit suicide. Stephen E. Henderson,
Response, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 47
(2011), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Henderson.pdf. Assuming such books exist,
Henderson’s fear seems questionable at best.
20 An ad network could determine the user’s geographic location from her Internet Protocol (IP) address
as well.
21 See Behavioral Advertising, supra note 10; Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 3.
22 For an excellent explanation of the evolution of cookie technology in online advertising, see Andrew
Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the Internet: Notice and Consent in the
Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529 (2008).
23 The Network Advertising Initiative defines cookies as “information (a small text file) that a site saves
to your computer using your web browser” that “may allow sites to record [a user’s] browsing activities” and
that “may be placed in [a user’s] browser by a third-party advertising network or company that helps deliver
18
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computer then stores on its hard drive.24 The cookie contains a unique number
that allows the ad network to identify the user when she connects to another
website within its network.25 Thus, by recognizing the user’s cookie, the ad
network can track the user across the Internet, gathering information about her
“web page visits, searches, online purchases, videos watched, [and] posts on
social network[s],” among other things.26
An ad network’s cookie categorizes the user’s online activity into distinct
“segments” that supposedly reflect her interests and that are used to determine
which ads to display.27 For example, according to an investigation on online
tracking conducted by the Wall Street Journal, one of the largest ad networks, a
company called RapLeaf, used segments such as “household income range,
age range, political leaning, and gender and age of children in the household,
as well as interests in topics including religion, the Bible, gambling, tobacco,
adult entertainment and ‘get rich quick’ offers.”28 In total, RapLeaf’s cookies
segmented Internet users into over four hundred categories.29 Armed with the
user’s browsing history represented in segments, the ad network can then
display advertisements that reflect the user’s interests when she is viewing a
website that is entirely unrelated to that interest. For example, if, after reading
the article about depression on the online women’s magazine, the Internet user
then visits another website to check the weather forecast, the ad network might
at that point display an ad for an antidepressant.
An ad network can then take the information it gathers through both
individual content providers and tracking cookies and compile everything it
knows about a particular user into a personal “profile.”30 These profiles are
often quite comprehensive—so much so that they can personally identify
individual Internet users.31 This can occur even if the ad network technically
the ads [a user] sees online.” Managing Your Privacy: FAQs, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.
networkadvertising.org/managing/faqs.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
24 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4.
25 Id.
26 Michael W. Macleod-Ball & Christopher Calabrese, Written Statement of the American Civil Liberties
Union, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 3 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Statement_for_11-1909_hearing_before_Subcommittees_on_Commun_Tech_and_the_Internet__Commerce_Trade_Consumer_Pro
tection.pdf.
27 See Cracking the Code, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2010), http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_
RAPLEAF_20101018.html.
28 Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at A1.
29 Id.
30 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4.
31 See id.
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does not collect any “personally identifiable information”—information such
as a “name, address, telephone number, email address, financial account
number, [and] government-issued identifier” that can be used “to identify,
contact or precisely locate a person.”32 Notably, ad networks are not bound
(legally or otherwise) to refrain from collecting personally identifiable
information, and as a result, ad networks that do so face few consequences in
the unlikely event they are detected.33
Finally, an ad network can supplement its user profiles with information
purchased from commercial third-party databases.34 For example,
“supermassive databases”—like those made available by companies such as
LexisNexis—offer billions of records about individuals aggregated from public
and private records.35 Thus, a user’s profile could reflect vast quantities of
highly sensitive personal information, including the user’s “demographics,
family information, and credit history.”36
Given the invasiveness of online tracking, wary Internet users may hope to
avoid behavioral targeting entirely. These users face no easy task. In fact, ad
networks have developed technological capabilities to actually prevent users
from effectively removing tracking cookies.37 For example, a mechanism
called a “Flash cookie” effectively bars a user from deleting tracking cookies

32 Managing Your Privacy: FAQs, supra note 23. The Wall Street Journal’s investigation of behavioral
targeting revealed that one ad network used enough specific segments in its cookies that it came “extremely
close” to “de-anonymizing” the user—at least “[close] enough to narrow him down to one of just 64 or so
people world-wide.” Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at A1 (emphasis added) (quoting Peter Eckersley, Technology Projects Director,
Electronic Frontier Foundation) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads
Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against
Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8 n.31 (2009) (“[R]esearch has shown that there is really no such
thing as non-personally identifiable information because nearly all so-called anonymized data can be linked to
a particular person.”).
33 See Hotaling, supra note 22, at 541 (“Amounting to little more than a non-binding policy statement,
the [self-regulatory] principles have no legal effect on the use of [behavioral targeting] technology by the
online advertising industry.”). See generally infra Part II.A (discussing the ad-network industry’s selfregulatory principles and the lack of effective legal regulation regarding the collection of personal
information).
34 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4.
35 Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1738 (2006).
36 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 4.
37 And as Edward Felten points out, “There are no technical barriers to the ad [network] selling this
information to third parties.” Id.
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by instantly and automatically regenerating deleted cookies.38 Flash cookies
are often embedded in online videos39 and are configured such that a user’s
browser saves them in a different location than it does tracking cookies.40
Thus, when the user deletes her tracking cookies, the Flash cookies remain on
her computer and can restore whatever tracking cookies she tried to remove.41
But even if a user successfully deletes all of her cookies—Flash and tracking—
it simply means that the ad network will install a new tracking cookie on her
browser.
When deleting cookies proves futile, an Internet user might then turn to
other security measures, which include opting out of individual ad networks or
installing privacy “plug-ins.”42 First, a user can opt out of an ad network to
limit or block targeted advertisements.43 Perhaps ironically, this process
requires the Internet user to install the ad network’s unique opt-out cookie on
her browser.44 But opting out of the various ad networks is not necessarily easy
or effective. For example, while two industry groups offer centralized locations
where a user can opt out of some ad networks,45 if an ad network does not
belong to one of those groups, a user must opt out of each individual ad
network separately. If, after opting out, a user erases the cookies on her
browser, she then must opt out from each ad network all over again.46 This
means that the unwary user who purposely erases her cookies as a privacy
precaution will become vulnerable to tracking cookies, as will the user who
inadvertently erases her cookies by selecting the “anonymous browsing”
setting on her Web browser, for example.47 But opting out has a more basic
flaw, which is that it offers no guarantee that the ad network will stop tracking

38 Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 3 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)
(explaining Flash-cookie technology and noting that Flash cookies selectively respawned ad-network tracking
cookies, but not opt-out cookies), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862;
see also Tanzina Vega, Code that Tracks Users’ Browsing Prompts Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at
B3 (reporting at least five class action lawsuits regarding companies’ use of Flash cookies).
39 Fifty-four of the top one hundred websites use Flash cookies. Soltani et al., supra note 38, at 3.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Vega, supra note 38.
42 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How to Avoid the Prying Eyes, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W3.
43 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6.
44 See id.
45 See Frequently Asked Questions, PRIVACYCHOICE, http://www.privacychoice.org/faq (last visited Mar.
27, 2012); Opt Out of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.
networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
46 Valentino-DeVries, supra note 42.
47 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6.
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the user.48 Instead, opting out of an ad network only has the effect of blocking
targeted ads,49 thereby imparting only a false—if not misleading—sense of
privacy. The Internet user who is seriously concerned about her privacy might
be better off installing privacy plug-ins. These tools can be used to regularly
delete cookies or to monitor invisible ad networks that track users without
serving targeted ads.50 But plug-ins are hardly an ideal or complete solution:
certain plug-ins might only work with certain browsers, and for
unsophisticated Internet users, these tools may be difficult to set up.
Ultimately, regardless of whether people realize it—and despite some
people’s efforts to avoid it—behavioral targeting has become an integral part
of the Internet, if not of everyday life. While the Internet has made large-scale
behavioral targeting technologically feasible, behavioral targeting has, in turn,
made the Internet sustainable as a limitless source of free content.
B. Behavioral Targeting and Free Public Access to Online Content
Online content providers depend heavily on selling ad space on their
websites to provide free online content. This dependence is made possible, in
part, by behavioral targeting.51 Because targeted ads are so effective compared
to other forms of online advertisements, content providers take in relatively

48 JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT
ENABLE IT 8 (2009), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=asc_
papers.
49 Testimony of Edward W. Felten, supra note 11, at 6. The user is still subjected to invisible tracking
through use of a “[W]eb beacon.” Id. at 4. Web beacons are pervasive even when Internet users do not opt out
of behavioral targeting. For example, one study revealed that Google’s ad services used Web beacons on
eighty-eight percent of the sampled websites and on ninety-two of the top one hundred most popular sites.
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ Understanding of
Behavioral Advertising 2 (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.tprcweb.com/
index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=0&view=finish&cid=123&catid=48.
50 Valentino-DeVries, supra note 42.
51 Content providers’ dependence upon ad revenue stems from a number of factors, including the
removal of meaningful barriers to making perfect copies of digital content on the Internet, rampant copyright
infringement, and the resulting inability of content providers to profit from direct sales. See Ben Depoorter et
al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2011) (“Digital downloading and file sharing present
unprecedented challenges to the enforcement of copyright law. These new technologies greatly facilitate
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted material.” (footnote omitted)). While the death of
copyright on the Internet is beyond the scope of this Comment, for an enlightening discussion of recent
technological advances, including the Web, that have created complications in the application of copyright
protections, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001).
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greater profits from selling online ad space.52 With increased profits, websites
can provide online content without needing to charge the Internet user a fee.53
As free online content has become the norm, behavioral targeting has become a
practical necessity for sustaining the Internet. In the words of the Network
Advertising Initiative, a cooperative of advertising networks, “[T]he increased
revenues associated with [targeted ads] are vital to supporting the continued
growth in ad-supported Web content.”54
When viewed in isolation, behavioral targeting is purely beneficial,
allowing for the continued growth of the Internet and the increasing
availability of free online content.55 And consider the alternative: If people
were required to pay even a small amount of money to access a website, it is
unlikely that the average Internet user would visit 2646 different websites each
month as they do currently.56 But the benefits of behavioral targeting are far
less compelling when viewed from a privacy perspective given the ease with
which online tracking invokes images of Orwell’s Big Brother57 or Jeremy
Bentham’s Panopticon.58 The current question, then, is whether the benefits of
behavioral targeting outweigh the potential privacy harms that result from the
near-constant tracking of Internet users.

52 See Beales, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that behavioral targeting is about twice as profitable as standard
online advertising techniques). One study found that revenue from behavioral targeting could be matched only
by “highly obtrusive ads.” Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display Advertising: Targeting and
Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389, 400 (2011).
53 Beales, supra note 4, at 1.
54 Memorandum from the Network Adver. Initiative to the Internet Policy Task Force 5–6 (June 14,
2010) (emphasis added), available at http://naiblog.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Commerce-Comments1.
pdf; accord Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, In Defense of Data: Information and the Costs of Privacy, 2
POL’Y & INTERNET 149, 157, 160 (2010) (explaining how privacy advocates often ignore the trade-off between
privacy and free information).
55 These benefits may seem even more attractive during difficult economic times, when consumers are
less likely to pay for online content. Testimony of Anne Toth, Vice President of Policy and Head of Privacy,
Yahoo! Inc., COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 3 (June 18, 2009), http://democrats.
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_toth.pdf.
56 Catharine Smith, Internet Usage Statistics: How We Spend Our Time Online, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/22/internet-usage-statistics_n_620946.html.
57 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
58 Bentham’s Panopticon is a prison in which none of the prisoners can see whether anyone is watching
them, but each knows that anyone could be watching at any time. Bentham described the Panopticon as a new
mode of obtaining “power of mind over mind,” “in [a] hitherto unexampled quantity.” MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201, 202, 206 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1975) (quoting 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37, 39 (John
Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) (1787)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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II. PRIVACY
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
59

—Olmstead v. United States

A. Introduction: Overview of Current Privacy Protections
The law offers little meaningful protection for Internet users seeking to
shield their online activity from the prying eyes of both private third parties
and the government. As a result, behavioral targeting poses a very real threat to
Internet users’ privacy.60
Internet users seeking to protect their information from private third parties
might turn to a variety of legal remedies: online privacy policies under a
contract theory, common law privacy torts, federal privacy laws, or the adnetwork industry’s self-imposed standards.61 These protections are fairly
limited. For example, with only a few exceptions,62 websites are not legally
required to adopt privacy policies. Privacy policies that websites do adopt are
often impossibly confusing and unreasonably lengthy for the average Internet
user, serving little purpose but to shield the website from liability.63 Therefore,
59 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
60 See Testimony to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, and the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 2–5 (June 18, 2009), http://democrats.energycommerce.house.
gov/Press_111/20090618/testimony_chester.pdf.
61 See Luke J. Albrecht, Note, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies and Remedies for Internet Users,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 424–37 (2003).
62 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1303, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (2006)
(requiring a privacy policy for websites that collect information about children under age thirteen); Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act § 502, id. § 6802(b)(1)(A) (requiring clear and conspicuous statements of informationgathering practices by an institution that is significantly engaged in financial activity if that institution
discloses nonpublic personal information to third parties).
63 See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOWPRIVACY 11 (2009), available at http://knowprivacy.org/report/
KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf (reporting that privacy policies are ineffective because they are difficult and
time-consuming to read, and lead consumers to believe they are protected); Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed.

BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL

568

5/1/2012 7:44 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:555

an Internet user seeking to enforce a website’s privacy policy against the
website under a contract theory is likely doomed from the outset.64 Similarly,
common law privacy torts—including intrusion into seclusion,
misappropriation of likeness, and public disclosure of private facts65—offer
weak remedies in the context of behavioral targeting because they require a
plaintiff to show some discrete harm committed by a distinct tortfeasor.66 This
is often a difficult task given the indirect and invisible nature of ad-network
activity.67
In addition, federal statutory privacy laws are complex and ill-equipped for
protecting Internet users from behavioral targeting.68 For example, while the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) offers Internet users
some protection from private parties intentionally accessing or intercepting
stored electronic communications,69 courts have held that the ECPA does not
apply to clickstream data.70 Similarly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
which protects against third parties obtaining unauthorized information by
accessing a computer,71 fails to provide any meaningful remedy because the
statute’s minimum-damages requirement is difficult to meet in the case of
behavioral targeting.72

Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public: Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing,
Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, & Technology 4
(Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf (“In many cases,
consumers don’t notice, read, or understand . . . privacy policies. They are often posted
inconspicuously . . . and filled with fine-print legalese and technotalk. A recent study . . . found that they were
essentially incomprehensible for the majority of Internet users.”).
64 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (inferring
that plaintiffs, a class of Internet users, gave implied consent for content providers to share personally
identifiable information with their contractual affiliates). But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329
F.3d 9, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to follow DoubleClick, explaining that “consent ‘should not casually
be inferred’” (quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990)).
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(a)–(c) (1977).
66 Hotaling, supra note 22, at 550.
67 See id.; see also Albrecht, supra note 61, at 433–36.
68 Gindin, supra note 32, at 34.
69 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The two
relevant sections of the ECPA are the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006), and the
Wiretap Act, id. §§ 2510–2522. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004) (explaining the ECPA).
70 See, e.g., In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. C 00-2746 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at
*4, 14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001) (noting that cookies placed on a hard drive are not in “electronic storage” for
the purpose of the Stored Communications Act); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (W.D.
Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
72 See, e.g., Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1158–60; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519–26.
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Finally, consumer-protection regulations offer little in the way of protection
against private third parties. For example, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has taken a hands-off approach to regulating behavioral targeting, only
periodically pressuring the ad-network industry to self-regulate.73 The adnetwork industry, in an unapologetic attempt to “[f]end off . . . legislation and
regulation,”74 has developed a set of guiding principles that focuses on
transparency, consumer control, data security, and accountability, among other
things.75 Regardless of the industry’s efforts, however, because ad networks
are not legally bound by their own rules, they are not forced to abide by
them.76 For example, according to a 2010 Wall Street Journal investigation,
RapLeaf, a major ad network, was discovered to have been transmitting
personally identifiable information linked to sensitive data to other companies
in violation of the industry principles.77
Recently, the FTC has renewed its efforts to crack down on what many
perceive to be an out-of-control industry. The FTC’s proposed guidelines
would allow Internet users to opt out of online tracking once and for all
through the creation of a national “Do Not Track” list, similar to the National
Do Not Call Registry for telemarketing.78 Though the proposals are by no
means perfect, they represent an important improvement.
Internet users seeking to restrict government access to information gathered
by private third parties face similarly steep legal obstacles. For example, one of
73 The FTC first expressed concern about targeted ads in 1999 and, in 2007, issued guidelines containing
general principles for behavioral targeting, see FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf, which it revised in 2009, see FTC, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf.
74 About the IAB, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab (last visited
Mar. 27, 2012).
75 AM. ASS’N OF ADVER. AGENCIES ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING 2–4 (2009), available at http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf. These
principles are based more or less on the FTC’s suggestions and include education, transparency, consumer
control, data security, material changes to existing online, behavioral-advertising policies and practices,
sensitive data, and accountability. Id. at 1.
76 See Gindin, supra note 32, at 34 (“A potential problem with self regulation is that unless there are
formal sanctions available for violations of established guidelines, some companies may be inclined to ignore
industry guidelines or to minimize their significance.”).
77 See Steel, supra note 28.
78 See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 63–69 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/
101201privacyreport.pdf; Testimony of Daniel J. Weitzner, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. DEMOCRATS 10
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20101202/Weitzner.Testimony.12.02.
2010.pdf.
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the most sweeping federal privacy laws regulating the government’s collection
and use of personal information, the Privacy Act of 1974, does not prevent the
government from accessing information gathered for behavioral targeting.79
This is because the Act likely does not apply when the government accesses
information from third-party databases without actually establishing its own
database or without “retriev[ing]” the information through use of a “name or
other personal identifier.”80 As a result, the Act would not apply in the case of
behavioral targeting where the government accesses information collected in
databases created and controlled by advertising networks. This conclusion is
particularly troubling because federal statutory laws are likely the only tools
for providing uniform privacy protection in the context of behavioral
targeting.81 Indeed, information gathered for behavioral targeting does not
seem to fall within the protective scope of the Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment is implicated when the government violates “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”82 There is a clear case that the
Fourth Amendment would protect people from direct online tracking
performed by the government, as opposed to an ad network.83 On the other
hand, because ad networks are not state actors, ad networks cannot violate
users’ Fourth Amendment rights by collecting information about them through
online tracking.

79

5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
See Privacy: The Use of Commercial Information Resellers by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census & Nat’l Archives of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th
Cong. 97 (2008) (testimony of Paula J. Bruening, Deputy Executive Director, Center for Information Policy
Leadership, Hunton & Williams LLP) [hereinafter Bruening Testimony] (quoting Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d
1403, 1408 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552a (stating that the Privacy Act only applies to
information maintained in a “system of records,” meaning a “group of any records under the control of any
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”). Further, under the ECPA, the government
can access or intercept routing information (e.g., websites visited by an Internet user) from an Internet Service
Provider as long as the government certifies to a court that the information it seeks is “relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation” and is “likely to be obtained.” 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1).
81 Though this Comment focuses on more broadly applicable privacy laws, it should be noted that some
states offer protection in this area. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11015.5(a) (West 2012) (requiring that
government agencies provide certain notices to individuals when collecting personal information
electronically).
82 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1018 (2010) (proposing a framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet and
arguing that the approach should apply to “content surveillance,” or surveillance of “private thoughts and
speech”).
80
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The relevant question, then, is whether the Fourth Amendment applies if
the government, though not doing the tracking itself, accesses information
gathered by ad networks. The answer to that question is probably in the
negative. Under the Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information a person “volunteers” to a third
party.84 The third-party doctrine would apply in the case of behavioral
targeting if, when a person goes online, she “volunteers” information about her
online activity to an ad network. This means that the government could obtain
all of the information compiled in an ad network’s profile database and use it
for whatever purpose it likes—for example, in a criminal investigation—even
though the database is comprised of information that the government could not
lawfully collect itself.85 In other words, the government could circumvent the
Fourth Amendment with the cooperation of an ad network and legally conduct
searches of every Internet user’s online activity, amounting to millions of
general fishing expeditions.
In fact, the government has been accessing and mining databases—its own
and those offered up by third parties—for years.86 In the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the government began accumulating and analyzing “vast
amounts of data about the everyday transactions of American citizens” through
its Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.87 In 2002 Congress passed the
Homeland Security Act, which authorized the Department of Homeland
Security to use data mining in its investigations.88 A related government
84

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
Bruening Testimony, supra note 80, at 97.
86 See Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-Parties to Launder Data
About ‘The People,’ 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950.
87 Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
317 (2008). Although Congress defunded TIA in 2003 in response to increasing privacy concerns, see
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 111(a), 117 Stat. 11, 534–36, many of
TIA’s programs have continued in other forms, see Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly
Dead?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php (last visited
Mar. 27, 2012).
88 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(14), 115 Stat. 2135, 2147 (codified at
6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(14) (2006)). Congress later passed the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. VIII, § 804, 121 Stat. 362 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3 (Supp. I 2007)), to require
some transparency in federal data-mining programs. The Act defines data mining as
85

a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or more electronic
databases, where a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a non-Federal entity
acting on behalf of the Federal Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other analyses
to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on
the part of any individual or individuals,
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program called ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and
Semantic Enhancement) was created “to troll a vast sea of information . . . and
extract suspicious people, places and other elements based on their links and
behavioral patterns.”89 As of 2007, the federal government was operating an
estimated two hundred data-mining programs.90 And while oversight of
government data-mining programs is fairly limited,91 a 2008 Government
Accountability Office report revealed that, in 2005, federal government
agencies—including the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security—reported plans “to spend a combined total of
approximately $30 million to purchase personal information from resellers.”92
According to the report, “The vast majority—approximately 91 percent—of
the planned spending was for purposes of law enforcement (69 percent) or
counterterrorism (22 percent).”93 Thus, it seems that commercial-database
companies and the government are already allies in the pursuit of personal
information.94
The remainder of this section offers an overview of the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine and important criticisms surrounding
it. It then discusses in greater detail why the doctrine likely would apply in the
case of behavioral targeting under the current legal landscape, as well as in the
event that the FTC’s proposed privacy protections succeed.

id. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(A), where the search is not done by name or with another personal identifier, id.
§ 2000ee-3(b)(1)(B), and if the purpose of the search “is not solely the detection of fraud, waste, or
abuse . . . or the security of a Government computer system,” id. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(C).
89 Slobogin, supra note 87, at 318 (quoting Ellen Nakashima & Alec Klein, Profiling Program Raises
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 192 (2007).
91 For example, the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b)(1)(B), 116 Stat. 2899,
2922, which requires that federal agencies publish Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) on data collected
through information technology, does not apply to searches of data collected by third parties. THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNMENT DATA MINING: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 17 (2010). Further, though the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007
requires federal agencies to compile annual reports on all data-mining activities, it allows agencies to keep
confidential material private and adopts a very narrow definition of what constitutes “data mining.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ee-3(c).
92 LINDA D. KOONTZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-543T, PRIVACY: GOVERNMENT
USE OF DATA FROM INFORMATION RESELLERS COULD INCLUDE BETTER PROTECTIONS 3 (2008) (footnote
omitted).
93 Id. at 3–4.
94 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1083, 1101 (2002).
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B. The Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine
You have no privacy. Get over it.
—Scott McNealy
CEO, Sun Microsystems, Inc.95

The Supreme Court’s modern formulation for determining when a search is
“unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment comes from its
landmark decision, Katz v. United States.96 In Katz, the Court held that law
enforcement had conducted an unreasonable search when it eavesdropped on
the defendant’s telephone-booth conversation using an electronic surveillance
device.97 According to Justice Stewart, “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places,”98 and a search is unreasonable if it “violate[s] the privacy
upon which [a person] justifiably relie[s].”99 The Court noted, however, that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”100
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, formulated his famous
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test,101 which has come to control when
determining whether a government search violates the Fourth Amendment. A
search is unreasonable when it violates a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, and a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable only if (1) that
person herself “exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and
(2) “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”102
One might expect that, given Justice Harlan’s test, the Fourth Amendment
would preclude the government from accessing and analyzing information
gathered by ad networks for behavioral targeting. After all, many people
subjectively expect privacy from the government when they use the Internet,
and their expectation would seem to be one that society would accept as
95

On the Record: Scott McNealy, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2003, at I1.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97 Id. at 349–50, 359.
98 Id. at 351.
99 Id. at 353. The defendant in Katz “justifiably relied” on his conversation remaining private because
“[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place
a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.” Id. at 352.
100 Id. at 351.
101 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102 Id.
96
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reasonable. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment likely does not protect
information about Internet users’ online activities because of the so-called
third-party doctrine.
The third-party doctrine holds that, under the Fourth Amendment, an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that she
volunteers to a third party. The Court’s classic statement of the doctrine comes
from United States v. Miller, a case in which law enforcement officials
obtained the defendant’s financial records from his bank without a warrant.103
The Supreme Court held that the government’s activity did not amount to an
unreasonable search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in records kept by a third party, his bank.104 According to the Court:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
105
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.

The Court justified its holding on the basis that the defendant had assumed the
risk that the bank would share his information with the government, regardless
of the defendant’s actual expectations of confidentiality. According to the
Court, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”106
The Court’s assumption-of-risk rationale was actually drawn from another
line of cases involving undercover agents and confidential informants.107
Beginning in the 1952 case of On Lee v. United States, the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed by one party to
another in the course of a conversation.108 The Court subsequently offered
some justification for its position in Hoffa v. United States, explaining that the
103

425 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1976).
Id. at 442. The Court further explained that it made no difference, for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, that the banks were required to maintain the defendant’s financial records pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act. Id. at 443. In addition, the Court rejected any Fourth Amendment challenges based on arguments
that the banks were acting as agents of the government or that the defendant received no notice of the
subpoenas. Id. at 443 & n.5.
105 Id. at 443.
106 Id.
107 Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
108 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952). A decade later, but still pre-Katz, the Court reaffirmed On Lee in Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427.
104
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Fourth Amendment does not protect “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”109
Post-Katz, the Court approved the line of cases in United States v. White,
reframing its reasoning to comport with the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test: a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information she has
shared with another person because she has assumed the risk that her confidant
might share that information with the government.110 In essence, the Court
extracted the assumption-of-risk justification from White and applied it in
Miller, which differed to the extent that the third party was an entity, instead of
another person.
After Miller, the Court developed its third-party doctrine in two more key
cases. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers he dialed from his home
telephone.111 The case involved a phone company, which, per the
government’s request, had installed a pen register112 on the defendant’s home
telephone to track his outgoing calls.113 The Court applied the third-party
doctrine after reasoning that a person “volunteers” information as long as most
people realize or should be aware of the possibility that third parties are
capable of collecting that information.114 According to the Court, “All
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the
telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed.”115 In other words, as long as most
people realize a third party is capable of collecting information, then any given
individual assumes the risk that the third party will not only collect that
information but also share it with the government.
Nearly a decade later, the Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Smith in its final
third-party-doctrine case, California v. Greenwood.116 In Greenwood, the
Court applied the third-party doctrine when the defendant placed a bag of trash
on the curb outside his home, finding that the defendant had “volunteered” its
109

385 U.S. at 302.
401 U.S. at 752 (“[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may
be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end
or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”).
111 442 U.S. 735, 745–52 (1979).
112 A pen register is a device that tracks the numbers dialed from a phone. Id. at 736 n.1.
113 Id. at 737.
114 Id. at 743–45.
115 Id. at 742.
116 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
110
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contents to a third party.117 The Court explained that most people realize that
almost anyone could access the contents of the trash, despite the low
probability that anyone besides a trash collector would.118
C. Responses to the Third-Party Doctrine
Since its inception, the third-party doctrine has elicited resistance from
lawmakers.119 For example, in response to Miller, Congress passed the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 to provide protection for financial records,120
and after Smith, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act to protect telephone
call records.121 Further, courts at both federal and state levels have been
reluctant to apply the doctrine. The Third Circuit, for example, declined to
apply the third-party doctrine in a case involving historical cell-site location
information, on the basis that a cell phone user “has not ‘voluntarily’ shared
his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”122 At
least eleven state supreme courts have refused to use the doctrine to interpret
their own constitutions, and ten states have shown signs that they might follow
suit.123
Legal commentators generally disagree with the soundness of the
doctrine,124 criticizing the Court’s understanding of what constitutes

117

Id. at 39–41.
Id. at 41.
119 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7(b)–(c), at 736, 747 (4th ed. 2004) (calling the
third-party doctrine “dead wrong,” “a crabbed interpretation” that “makes a mockery of the Fourth
Amendment”).
120 Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006)).
121 Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1868 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127).
122 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010). But see, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“[C]omputer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their [Internet Service
Provider] subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person—the system operator.”);
United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *12 n.4 (per curiam) (4th Cir. Aug.
3, 2000) (“While the Court is aware of the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the Internet as well as the vast extent of
communications it has initiated, the [Internet Service Provider subscription] information at issue in this case is
not distinguishable from the materials in Miller and Smith . . . .”).
123 Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its
State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395
tbl.1 (2006).
124 As Professor Orin Kerr notes, “A list of every article or book that has criticized the doctrine would
make [for] the world’s longest law review footnote.” Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5 (2009).
118
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“reasonable” expectations of privacy as out of touch with reality.125 Many of
their arguments trace back to the Court’s assumption-of-risk justification,
which, upon close scrutiny, seems inherently flawed. Assumption of risk is a
theory based in contract, in which a person who assumes a risk receives some
benefit or consideration in return, and in which—but for a particular benefit—
she would not assume the risk.126 But a person can only truly “assume” a risk if
she is both informed of the risk—meaning she understands and appreciates its
potential consequences and the possibility that they might occur—and has the
ability to either accept or reject the risk.127 If these two conditions are satisfied,
then by assuming a risk, a person effectively consents to bear the risk’s
consequences should they come to pass. Assumption of risk, then, is
synonymous with voluntary consent.
Assumption of risk, however, must be distinguished from the concept of
“notice.” When a person has notice of a risk, she has satisfied only one of the
two conditions required for assumption of risk: while she has knowledge of a
risk, she does not necessarily accept it or consent to it.128 For example, drawing
from an analogy offered by Professor Epstein, a pedestrian who decides to go
for a walk knows, at a certain level, that she could be run over by a car, but she
has not agreed to be run over.129 Under tort law, the pedestrian does not
assume the risk that she will be run over by simply going for a walk, even
though the pedestrian has some notice of the risk.130
The notice principle has no place in the Fourth Amendment and especially
in the third-party doctrine. As Professor Epstein observes, the Court’s “false
equation of knowledge of a risk with the assumption of the risk” leads to a
“potential source of abuse” by the government131: if the government notifies
everyone that it can search every house, then everyone has “assumed the risk”

125 See id. at 571 (“Such expectations of privacy are common and reasonable, and Justices who cannot see
that are simply out of touch with society and are misapplying the Fourth Amendment.”).
126 Professor Richard Epstein charts the doctrinal origins of the assumption-of-risk theory under the thirdparty doctrine. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of
Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199 (2009).
127 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in the
concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice.”); Epstein, supra note 126, at 1204.
128 See Epstein, supra note 126, at 1204. Under common law, this concept is known as sciens non est
volens (“knowing is not volunteering”).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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that their houses will be searched merely because they know their houses will
be searched.132 The result is absurd.
Nevertheless, the notice principle is central to the third-party doctrine. In its
strictest form, the Court equates notice of risk with assumption of risk in two
instances. First, under the third-party doctrine, a person is said to have
“volunteered” information to a third party as long as society in general is aware
that a third party is capable of collecting information.133 Thus, if the Court
decides that people in general have notice of a risk, the Court treats any given
individual as having consented to the risk as though the individual had both
actual knowledge of the risk and an opportunity to reject it.
Second, even in situations where a person has truly consented to sharing
information with a third party, the Court treats this limited consent as consent
to allow the third party to share that information with the government—or,
stated another way, as consent to a government search.134 Again, the Court’s
reasoning depends on equating society’s general awareness of the risk—the
possibility that a third party might share information with the government—
with an individual’s actual knowledge and acceptance of the risk. And while
there are circumstances in which a person can simply choose not to share
information with a third party, in many situations, that option is unrealistic or
effectively unavailable. Indeed, participating in everyday life more or less
requires sharing information with many third parties. Thus, the inherent flaw in
the third-party doctrine is that the assumption-of-risk rationale “leaves nothing
to the underlying substantive right at all.”135
D. New Technology and the Hopeful Demise of the Third-Party Doctrine
Despite the lack of enthusiasm toward the third-party doctrine shared by
Congress, lower federal courts, state courts, and commentators, the Supreme
132

See id. at 1205.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988). Moreover, as Justice Marshall noted in his
dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, the Court seems too comfortable imputing to society a general
awareness of third parties’ capabilities to access information, as, for example, in the situation of the telephone
company’s use of a pen register to track phone numbers. See 442 U.S. 735, 749 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Lacking the Court’s apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation’s telephone books and the
reading habits of telephone subscribers, I decline to assume general public awareness of how obscene phone
calls are traced.” (citation omitted)).
134 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) (noting that the third-party doctrine is flawed in
that “it treats exposure to a limited audience as morally equivalent to exposure to the whole world”).
135 Epstein, supra note 126, at 1205.
133
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Court has never seriously questioned the doctrine. But two of the Court’s more
recent cases offer hope that the third-party doctrine may not survive in its
harshest form, especially when applied in the context of new technology.
First, in the 2001 case Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court indicated
that it might be shifting away from the notice-based meaning of “volunteer”
under the third-party doctrine.136 Ferguson was a case in which the third-party
doctrine arguably should have applied but which, curiously, was decided under
the “special needs doctrine”—an exception to the warrant requirement,
applicable when the government conducts a suspicionless search that is
motivated by non-law-enforcement purposes.137 At issue was the validity of a
policy initiated by a hospital and implemented by local law enforcement,
requiring pregnant women to submit to drug tests in the course of prenatal
treatment if they met specified criteria indicating cocaine use.138 If a woman’s
urine tested positive for cocaine, the results “would be turned over to the police
and . . . could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions.”139 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the maternity patient had a
reasonable expectation of privacy that “the results of [her urine] tests [would]
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”140
Only Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that the case fell squarely within
the third-party doctrine.141 As he correctly pointed out, the Court had “never
held—or even suggested—that material which a person voluntarily entrusts to
someone else cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for
whatever evidence it may contain.”142 The majority responded to Justice
Scalia’s argument by stating that, because its decision proceeded on the
assumption that “the patients [had] not consent[ed] to the searches,” the
patients had not “voluntarily entrust[ed]” any information to a third party.143
Thus, Justice Stevens suggested that some form of actual consent, as opposed
to mere notice, was required to trigger the third-party doctrine.
136

532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 78–81. Under the special needs doctrine, the Court applies a balancing test to determine whether
a suspicionless search is nevertheless reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 78. The government’s
non-law-enforcement interest must outweigh the person’s privacy interest. See id.
138 Id. at 70–72.
139 Id. at 86.
140 Id. at 78.
141 See id. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because the defendant had voluntarily provided access to the
evidence, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy to invade.”).
142 Id. at 95. Justice Scalia noted that the Ferguson decision “opens a hole in [the Court’s] Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the size and shape of which is entirely indeterminate.” Id.
143 Id. at 85 n.24 (majority opinion).
137
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However, Justice Stevens did not clarify the nature of the consent to which
he was referring: Would he have required the patients’ consent for the purpose
of a government search or, alternatively, only for the limited purpose of
medical treatment?144 Adopting the former interpretation would effectively
overrule Miller. Adopting the latter interpretation would narrow the third-party
doctrine so that it would only apply to cases in which a person actually
consents to giving information to a third party. This would mean that the
doctrine would not apply in cases like Smith, in which the Court held that the
defendant had “volunteered” information to the phone company simply
because people in general were on notice of the third party’s capacity to gather
the information. Whatever meaning Justice Stevens intended, courts apparently
have not read the dictum as either eliminating or limiting the doctrine.
Regardless, Ferguson may prove important in redefining, or perhaps reigning
in, the meaning of the word “volunteer” under the third-party doctrine in the
future.145
The Court’s 2010 decision in City of Ontario v. Quon suggests that other
factors could impose broader limitations on the third-party doctrine.146 In
Quon, a police officer alleged that the city had violated his Fourth Amendment
rights when the city obtained from a mobile-service provider a transcript of
text messages the officer had sent from his city-issued pager.147 The transcript
revealed that the officer had sent non-work-related text messages in violation
of the city’s policy.148 Although the Court deferred the question of whether the
police officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, it
found for the city, explaining that the search, whatever its nature, was
reasonable.149 Importantly, the Court stressed the need for lower courts to
exercise caution when applying the Fourth Amendment within the context of
new technology:

144 Id. Professor Thai suggests that, in applying Ferguson in future third-party-doctrine cases, “one might
ask whether other disclosures to third parties fairly constitute general relinquishments of privacy or serve the
more limited function of obtaining services that have become essential to life in our society.” Thai, supra note
35, at 1749.
145 See Christopher Slobogin, Transactional Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 190
(2005); Thai, supra note 35, at 1748–49 (arguing that Ferguson limits the third-party doctrine to situations in
which “volunteering” information is truly elective).
146 See 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
147 Id. at 2624–26.
148 Id. at 2626.
149 Id. at 2630. To the frustration of lower courts, see, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 845–46 (11th
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011), the Court sidestepped the Fourth Amendment issue almost
entirely, see Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
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The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear. . . .
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and
information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself
but in what society accepts as proper behavior. . . .
. . . Cell phone and text message communications are so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.
150
That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.

The excerpt reveals the Court’s sensitivity toward two important factors. First,
courts should be wary of society’s real expectations of privacy, and judges
should avoid imposing their own conceptions of when privacy is reasonable.
Second, courts should be alert for circumstances in which technology might be
a necessary medium for protected First Amendment activity, suggesting that
expectations of privacy in “self-expression” and “self-identification” warrant
protection under the Fourth Amendment. Though the effect of Quon has yet to
be seen, the case offers some hope that the Court might be willing to limit the
third-party doctrine in certain situations involving new technology.
E. Does the Third-Party Doctrine Apply to Behavioral Targeting?
Many commentators fear that the third-party doctrine applies to personal
information collected by commercial databases. These commentators,
including Christopher Slobogin,151 Stephen Henderson,152 and Daniel
Solove,153 have noted the very real danger the doctrine poses in a world of
increasing digitization and automation.154 As Daniel Solove puts it, the Court’s
third-party doctrine is “not responsive” to the fact that most people’s personal
150

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629–30.
See Slobogin, supra note 145, at 155–57.
152 See Henderson, supra note 123, at 392–93 (arguing that the third-party doctrine “provides no leash at
all” on government access to third-party databases); Henderson, supra note 19, at 39–40 (explaining that the
doctrine, as it stands today, would seemingly apply to information in commercial databases but hoping that
“the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine . . . has at least taken ill, and it can be hoped it is an illness from
which it will never recover”).
153 See Solove, supra note 94, at 1137–38.
154 Other scholars have adopted this view. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 621–22 (2004); Thai, supra note 35, at 1745 (“[A]ny expectation of privacy
that we may have [about third-party databases] would be unreasonable under Miller and Smith’s riskassumption rationale.”); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 638
(2011) (arguing that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information reviewed automatically by
a computer and, therefore, the government infringes upon that expectation by accessing the information).
151
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information is aggregated and stored by hundreds of different entities; as a
result, Solove warns, the doctrine “poses one of the most significant threats to
privacy in the twenty-first century.”155
Assuming that the third-party doctrine applies to behavioral targeting,
Solove does not overstate its potential danger. There are two arguments worth
noting, however, that call into question the doctrine’s inevitable application to
behavioral targeting. First, most Internet users do not meaningfully consent to
behavioral targeting—especially in its current, deregulated form—and many
more are not even aware of its existence.156 If most Internet users are not even
aware of tracking, then an individual might not be said to have “volunteered”
information to an ad network. In turn, if an individual does not “volunteer” her
information, she also does not assume the risk that an ad network will share her
information with the government. Second, if the Court adopts Justice Stevens’s
dictum in Ferguson—which suggested, at the very least, that a person only
“volunteers” information to a third party if she affirmatively consents to
sharing information with the third party157—the doctrine is even less likely to
apply.158 Even if Internet users are fully aware of online tracking, they are not
given a chance to meaningfully consent to it, short of having the option to
forgo use of the Internet entirely. These considerations arguably provide some
basis for finding that an Internet user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information collected by an ad network.
The possibility that the third-party doctrine does not apply to behavioral
targeting because of either of the preceding two arguments creates a
paradoxical situation with regard to privacy. On the one hand, the fact that
most people are unaware they are being tracked on the Internet is beneficial to
the extent that, because of their shared ignorance, their Fourth Amendment
privacy in the information collected about them would be preserved. On the
other hand, it is difficult to find comfort in the fact that people are

155

Solove, supra note 94, at 1087.
One study concluded that users are only “passingly familiar” with cookies, and their understanding of
behavioral targeting is fraught with “widespread confusion.” McDonald & Cranor, supra note 49, at 7–8.
157 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001)
158 Given the current state of online privacy policies, it would be a stretch to say that Internet users
meaningfully “consent” to their terms. See Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 14–15 (2010) (statement of Hon. Jonathan D. Leibowitz, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission) (“[P]rivacy policies have become complicated legal documents that often seem
designed to limit companies’ liability, rather than to inform consumers about their information
practices. . . . [C]onsumers do not understand the extent to which companies are collecting, using, aggregating,
storing, and sharing their personal information.”); sources cited supra note 63.
156
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unknowingly subjected to constant surveillance. To that end, recall the possible
improvements on the horizon: the FTC’s proposed “Do Not Track” list, which,
if implemented, would allow consumers to choose to definitively opt out of
behavioral targeting.159
But the consequence of adopting the FTC’s proposals (or anything like
them) is that the application of the third-party doctrine would be seemingly
unavoidable when Internet users choose to “opt in” to behavioral targeting.
Granting Internet users the power to opt in or out means that both the
individual Internet user and people in general will have notice that behavioral
targeting occurs. As a result, those Internet users who decide to opt in will
have effectively consented to tracking. But Internet users who decide to opt out
will face another set of consequences. According to one industry expert,
“[o]pting out of tracking may actually harm consumers” because “[m]uch of
the free content online today may be[come] unavailable.”160 Assuming that
those who opt out would be barred from accessing ad-supported online
content, the unavoidable conclusion is that, in the very near future, a person
will only be able to access the Internet to the extent it is available today if she
agrees to be tracked by a third party—and, by extension, the government.161 In
light of this conclusion, it would seem that the third-party doctrine cannot, in
the words of Professor Stephen Henderson, “withstand the pressures which
technology and social norms are placing upon it.”162 In the event that the
Supreme Court does revisit the doctrine, the question is how it should go about
doing so. The following Part offers one possible solution.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files.
163

—Whalen v. Roe

159

See supra note 78.
Tanzina Vega & Verne Kopytoff, The Opt-Out Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at B1.
161 Chances are Internet users would likely not opt out of online tracking if a more secure Internet
experience meant a more expensive one. See Alastair R. Beresford et al., Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A
Field Experiment (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5017, 2010).
162 Henderson, supra note 19, at 51. Professor Henderson offers his own solution—a four-factor test—for
determining reasonable expectations of privacy in information given to a third party. Id. at 50–51.
163 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
160
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Commentators who argue that the third-party doctrine applies to
commercial databases focus on the government’s invasion of people’s
“information privacy.”164 Information privacy, as distinct from “autonomy
privacy,” is best defined as a person’s right to control the gathering, use, and
dissemination of personal information.165 Autonomy privacy, by contrast, is a
person’s privacy interest in acting in certain ways and making decisions.166
Though information privacy and autonomy privacy are often described as
distinct ideas, the two interests are actually “intimately intertwined.”167
Information reflects a person’s actions or choices because any action or choice
will generate some information, by way of inference, about the underlying
act.168 For example, in the context of behavioral targeting, an Internet user may
have an information-privacy interest in the information collected about her
online activity but an autonomy-privacy interest in choosing to access the
various types of online content reflected in the information. The two interests
are inseparable because the information an ad network collects about the user
will necessarily represent what content the user chooses to access.
Though information and autonomy interests are difficult to sever
conceptually, the law treats them as separate and discrete.169 As the Supreme
Court recently explained, privacy is typically characterized in the law as
“involv[ing] ‘at least two different kinds of interests’: one, an ‘interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters’; the other, an interest in ‘making

164 See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006)
(reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(2004)) (observing the “collective effort by a group of scholars to identify a law of ‘information privacy’ and
to establish information privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry” (footnote omitted)).
165 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2004, at 215, 216–17; Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible
and Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 357, 361 (2000); Richards, supra note 164.
166 See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2011).
167 Glancy, supra note 165, at 360.
168 See id. at 360–62.
169 So do commentators. Professor Richards describes the phenomenon:

Understandings of the privacy right recognized in [the Court’s autonomy-privacy cases] as being
related to informational meanings of the word are generally considered by scholars to be beside
the point. To the extent that they consider informational meanings of the word ‘privacy’ in
connection with [autonomy-privacy cases], scholars generally either note the ambiguity and
move on, or expressly reject any reading of it as an information privacy case.
Richards, supra note 164, at 1107 (footnote omitted).
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certain kinds of important decisions’ free from government interference.”170
Or, in the words of Professor Neil Richards, information privacy is “a limit on
the state’s power to scrutinize” personal information representing autonomous
acts, whereas autonomy privacy is “the individual right to make certain kinds
of fundamental decisions without state interference.”171 Professor Richards
emphasizes the meaninglessness of this distinction, noting that the legal
difference between the two is a matter of definitional subtlety.172 And indeed,
this distinction is circular: limiting the state’s power to scrutinize an interest
necessarily results in less state interference with the interest; in turn, if the state
cannot interfere with an interest, it also cannot scrutinize the interest.
Nevertheless, the categorization of privacy as either informational or
autonomy-based has led to the development of divergent bodies of
constitutional jurisprudence dealing with each.173 Information privacy tends to
be the subject of the Fourth Amendment, whereas autonomy privacy is
associated with substantive due process protections found in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,174 and expressive and associational freedoms
170 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 755 (footnote omitted) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).
In January 2011, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion in which it stated that a person’s “‘interest in
avoiding disclosure’[ of personal information] . . . may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’” Id. at
751 (third alteration in original) (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, 605). In NASA v. Nelson, the Court
assumed for its analysis that the Constitution protects “information privacy”—at least defined as the right to
control dissemination of personal information—under substantive due process. Id. The case involved NASA
employees who were challenging the government agency’s intrusive background checks. Id. In an 8–0 opinion,
the Court held that the government had a rational basis for conducting the background checks, and as a result,
the employees’ hypothetical information privacy was not violated. Id. at 758–59. Notably, the employees’
Fourth Amendment challenge was not at issue on appeal; the Ninth Circuit had discarded it under the thirdparty doctrine. Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 876–77 (2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 746. Justice Scalia, in his
concurring opinion, rejected the notion of a constitutional right to informational privacy and warned, in
reference to the clear applicability of United States v. Miller, that “[c]ourts should not use the Due Process
Clause as putty to fill up gaps they deem unsightly in the protections provided by other constitutional
provisions.” Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Though the implications of
Nelson are far from clear, the case seems to forecast an increasing segmentation and categorization of
constitutional privacy. Rather than exploring that forecast in detail, this Comment seeks to resolve the
problems arising from categorizing privacy that manifest in the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine. As
such, “information privacy” in this Comment refers to the right to control not only the dissemination but also
the collection and retention of personal information.
171 Richards, supra note 164, at 1112.
172 Id. at 1115–16.
173 Glancy, supra note 165, at 360.
174 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006) (distinguishing between
“decisional privacy” and “information privacy,” and stating that decisional privacy falls under substantive due
process); Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (describing the different doctrinal frameworks under which the Fourth Amendment and
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect privacy).
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guaranteed by the First Amendment.175 For the most part, the categorization
works well enough. In certain cases, however, distinguishing between two
types of constitutionally protected privacy is problematic.176 The third-party
doctrine offers a prime example. Under the third-party doctrine, if a person
“volunteers” information to a third party, she loses all constitutional protection
for the information, regardless of whether it reflects an underlying autonomy
interest that is otherwise protected by the Constitution.177 The result is that the
third-party doctrine permits the government to indirectly interfere with a
person’s constitutionally protected autonomy privacy under the pretext that the
person is not entitled to information privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Stated differently, the third-party doctrine works as a vehicle to circumvent
constitutional protections beyond the Fourth Amendment.
The remainder of this Comment will explore the nuances of constitutional
privacy interests in relation to the third-party doctrine, with the goal of
reconciling the problems that arise in the context of behavioral targeting. The
following section discusses two initial premises that are critical to resolving
problems inherent in the third-party doctrine. First, Fourth Amendment privacy
consists of both information- and autonomy-privacy interests—what will be
referred to as “information/autonomy privacy.” Second, the third-party
doctrine is better justified by a rationale that takes into account the third
party’s privacy interests—specifically, the third party’s autonomy interest in
sharing information with the government, referred to in this Comment as the
“third-party-privacy justification.” With these two concepts in mind, the
Comment then offers a new analytical framework for the doctrine, called the
“competing-interests test.” Under the competing-interests test, the result in any
third-party-doctrine case will depend on a weighing of the individual’s
information/autonomy interest against the third party’s competing autonomy
interest. Depending on which party’s interest prevails, the individual’s
autonomy/privacy interest will either be subject to the third-party doctrine or
be deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The Comment concludes by
applying the competing-interests test in the context of behavioral targeting and
by then addressing possible criticisms of the competing-interests test.
175

See Crocker, supra note 174, at 12, 20, 22.
According to Professor Richards, the “informational/decisional binary”—as he calls it—is
“imperfect—a crude sorting of cases that does not hold up well to careful analysis.” Richards, supra note 164,
at 1115. Richards concludes that the “ambiguity has persisted [in constitutional privacy] such that
informational elements can be found even in cases falling undoubtedly on the decisional [or autonomy] side of
the binary.” Id. at 1114.
177 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
176
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A. Reconceptualizing the Third-Party Doctrine: Information/Autonomy
Privacy and Third-Party Autonomy
This section explains two concepts that are key to understanding and
reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine. First, as already described, Fourth
Amendment protections encompass both information- and autonomy-privacy
interests—what can be described as a single information/autonomy interest.
Second, a better justification for the third-party doctrine lies in protecting the
third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with the government,
not in an individual’s assumption of the risk that a third party will share
information with the government.
First, reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine requires accepting, as an
initial premise, that privacy cannot be viewed in a vacuum—as relating either
to personal information or to personal choices—because personal information
inevitably must reflect personal choices. Denying protection for personal
information results in a denial of protection for the underlying act. Thus, one of
the main flaws in the third-party doctrine is that it applies only to information
volunteered to a third party. In the three main third-party-doctrine cases, for
example, the Court consistently speaks of “information” volunteered to a third
party and frames the individual’s expectation of privacy as being in
information. The Miller case dealt with information from the defendant’s
financial records,178 Smith with telephone calling records,179 and Greenwood
with the information gleaned from the content of trash.180 This makes sense:
What else could a third party ever receive from an individual (short of tangible
objects) that she could then share with the government? But by rigidly
categorizing an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy as solely
informational, the Court overlooks the individual’s underlying autonomyprivacy interests. For example, in Miller, the Court overlooked the defendant’s
interest in using a bank account; in Smith, the defendant’s interest in making
phone calls; and in Greenwood, the defendant’s interest in disposing of trash.
The case of behavioral targeting is no different: a person has an informationprivacy interest in information collected by an ad network and, necessarily, an
autonomy-privacy interest in accessing the Internet.
Recognizing one sweeping Fourth Amendment information/autonomy
privacy interest is especially important because, in some circumstances, the
178
179
180

Id. at 437–38.
442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979).
486 U.S. 35, 37–38 (1988).

BROTHERTON GALLEYSFINAL

588

5/1/2012 7:44 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:555

individual’s underlying autonomy interest is otherwise protected by the
Constitution.181 As already noted, the third-party doctrine has the power to
eviscerate those protections and could even be used to purposely circumvent
them.
For example, the third-party doctrine would seem to apply to information
even when it reflects an underlying autonomy interest protected by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. By way of
background, the Court first recognized a constitutional right to autonomy
privacy under the Due Process Clause in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which it
held that people have a right to marital privacy, which includes the right to use
contraceptives.182 The Court has since expanded autonomy-privacy interests
emanating from substantive due process to protect decisions and activities
related to family,183 reproduction,184 sex,185 and medical treatment.186
Generally speaking, the reasoning behind these cases stems from the notion
that substantive due process protects the right to make intimate decisions
without government interference. In other words, as the Court recently
explained, substantive due process protects what society considers “the most
private human conduct.”187

181 For example, in the case of behavioral targeting, an Internet user may have an underlying autonomy
interest in engaging in protected First Amendment activity. If the information collected about such activity is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment, then the Internet user’s First Amendment rights are effectively
curtailed, either because she will be substantially deterred from engaging in protected activity or because the
information gathering itself constitutes a direct interference with her expressive freedoms.
182 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
183 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing that “freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” including
“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (upholding the right of a
non-nuclear family to live and stay together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (upholding
marriage as a “basic civil right[] of man” and rejecting a restriction that prohibited interracial marriages
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (finding that the right to
purchase and use contraceptives is constitutionally protected); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (recognizing
procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man” and “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race”).
185 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (establishing the right to engage in private, sexual
conduct).
186 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment . . . .”); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980) (holding that a prison cannot involuntarily subject prisoners to psychiatric treatment
without additional due process protections).
187 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the third-party doctrine in theory applies to information that
reflects protected First Amendment activity as well.188 The First Amendment
protects another type of autonomy-privacy interest, distinct from the autonomy
interest established in the Griswold line of cases and stemming from
substantive due process.189 The First Amendment safeguards autonomy in the
realm of religious practice, democratic participation, and, as Justice Thurgood
Marshall once noted, “the human spirit—a spirit that demands selfexpression.”190 Indeed, freedom of speech is perhaps the ultimate autonomy
interest, providing the key to “individual self-realization”191 and “autonomous
self-determination.”192 These protections provide not only for individual
autonomy but also for broader, societal autonomy, because freedom of speech
furthers society’s ability to seek out knowledge and truth, and to engage in
collective decision making.193 Society’s autonomy interest is manifest in the
right to engage in the political process and, ultimately, “the right to participate
in the building of the whole culture.”194 The First Amendment provides broad
privacy protections to further these autonomy interests, including the rights to
explore ideas, to associate freely, and to remain anonymous.195

188 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Professor Daniel Solove has written about the
problematic intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments, arguing that the Founders intended the Fourth
Amendment to act as a first line of defense for First Amendment rights. Daniel J. Solove, The First
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007).
According to Solove, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is supposed to protect First
Amendment activity, such that when First Amendment activity is implicated, the Fourth Amendment should
always require the government to obtain a warrant. Solove, supra. Solove draws from Supreme Court
precedent demanding that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement be observed with “scrupulous
exactitude” when First Amendment interests are implicated. Id. at 128–32; accord Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 484–85 (1965). Nevertheless, the third-party doctrine creates the possibility that First Amendment
activity might fall outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment and, as a result, receive no protection at all.
189 Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
190 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
191 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
192 David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
193 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989).
194 Id. (quoting THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
195 See Solove, supra note 188, at 121 (arguing that government information gathering can threaten
privacy protections of the First Amendment); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v.
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–67 (2002) (invalidating an ordinance that required a government permit
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The third-party doctrine is at odds with constitutionally protected autonomy
interests emanating from substantive due process and the First Amendment,
placing them in tension with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, one key to
reconciling conflicting notions of constitutional privacy is to recognize an
expansive conception of Fourth Amendment privacy that encompasses both
information and autonomy interests.
Second, in addition to adopting a broader Fourth Amendment privacy
interest, the Court must replace its flawed assumption-of-risk rationale for the
third-party doctrine with an alternative justification—referred to here as the
third-party-privacy justification. Under the third-party-privacy justification, the
third-party doctrine is a mechanism for protecting the third party’s autonomy
interest in sharing information with the government, rather than a limit on an
individual’s privacy based on assumption of risk.196 Mary Coombs argues in
favor of such an approach, explaining that “[t]o deny even the possibility of
such a decision [by the third party] is to turn a freely chosen relationship
[between the third party and an individual] into a status, denying one person’s
full personhood to protect another’s interests.”197 In other words, the thirdparty doctrine is necessary for protecting the third party’s “full personhood,”
even at the expense of the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy.
When viewed through the lens of the third-party-privacy justification, the
third-party doctrine, as it exists now, represents a compromise between two
competing interests: the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest—
what the Court perceives as a limited information-privacy interest—weighed
against a third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with the
government. If viewed from this perspective, one of the inherent problems with
before the distribution of religious pamphlets as a violation of the First Amendment right to anonymous
political speech); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–23, 527 (1960) (holding that municipalities
could not require the disclosure of NAACP membership lists and that such a requirement significantly
interfered with members’ freedom-of-association rights); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63, 466
(1958) (holding that state scrutiny of NAACP membership lists violated members’ rights to associate freely
and privately).
196 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159; Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or
the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1643–44 (1987); Slobogin, supra note 145, at 185 (“The
reason we should treat [personal] interviews differently from [impersonal, automated] records requests is not
because privacy somehow is irrelevant in the former situation, but because the target’s interest in privacy is
countered by an even stronger interest—the third party’s autonomy.”).
197 Coombs, supra note 196, at 1644. On the other hand, Stephen Henderson has described the third
party’s interest in sharing information with the government as a “good citizen” as irrelevant and insufficient to
overcome an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975,
1015 (2007).
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the Court’s third-party doctrine becomes that, as a rule, the result of weighing
the two competing interests is always the same. Under the Court’s third-party
doctrine, the third party’s interest always prevails. In essence, the third party’s
autonomy interest in sharing information with the government is treated as
absolute.
In light of the third-party-privacy justification, this result makes the most
sense when the third party is a person, or people in general (the public), as
opposed to an entity. As Professor Slobogin observes, the notion that “no
person should be able to prevent another from providing information to the
government” is virtually “incontestable.”198 In cases that involve human third
parties, such as the undercover-agent and confidential-informant cases (which,
to recall, were precursors to Miller199), placing a high value on the third party’s
autonomy interest is not particularly troubling.200
On the other hand, when the third party is not a person, the result of the
third-party doctrine under the third-party-privacy justification is less
compelling.201 Why should a person’s privacy be compromised for the sake of
an entity’s seemingly lesser autonomy interest? While, at times, the Court has
reserved a lesser privacy interest for “collective” entities—in one instance
stating that “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the
enjoyment of a right to privacy”202—the Court has also affirmed the notion that
corporate entities possess broad autonomy interests under the Constitution,
including, for example, in the realm of the First Amendment.203 The current
state of the third-party doctrine reflects the latter sentiment, at least to the
extent that entities prevailed in all three of the Court’s traditional third-partydoctrine cases. Recall that, in Miller, the third party was a bank; in Smith, a
phone company; and, in Greenwood, a refuse collection company. But
regardless of the Court’s position on entities’ privacy or autonomy interests—
198

SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
200 See supra note 196.
201 According to Professor Slobogin, “A bank, hospital, or ISP is not denied its ‘personhood’ when its
ability to turn information over to the government is restricted.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 159. Slobogin
argues that entity third parties by their nature do not have any autonomy privacy. See id. (explaining the
justification for the low relevancy requirement to support a subpoena duces tecum for corporate records).
202 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). Within the context of the Fifth
Amendment, for example, an organization that has an identity separate from its individual members does not
have a right to resist a documentary subpoena, because its records lie outside the “zone of privacy.” SLOBOGIN,
supra note 90, at 187; see also, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73–75 (1906).
203 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First
Amendment interest in political speech).
199
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which is far from clear—instinct suggests that a corporation’s autonomy
interest in sharing information with the government should yield, at times, to
an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy. Thus, in adopting the third-partyprivacy justification for the third-party doctrine, it is essential to recognize that
the third party’s interest should not be treated as absolute.
To summarize, then, reconceptualizing the third-party doctrine requires that
the Court recognize the two important points discussed so far. First, Fourth
Amendment privacy consists of a broad information/autonomy privacy
interest, which may implicate autonomy interests that are otherwise protected
by the Constitution. Second, the third-party doctrine is better justified as a
means of protecting the third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information
with the government. The third party’s interest, while valuable, is not absolute,
and perhaps there are circumstances in which the third party’s autonomy
interest should yield to an individual’s Fourth Amendment
information/autonomy interest.
B. The “Competing-Interests Test”
With these ideas in mind, the Court should adopt a new analytical
framework for the third-party doctrine—what will be referred to as the
“competing-interests test” for the purposes of this discussion. The competinginterests test is comprised of a two-step analysis. First, the Court must assign
independent values to both the individual’s and the third party’s competing
interests, which include the individual’s information/autonomy interest on the
one hand and the third party’s autonomy interest in sharing information with
the government on the other. Second, the Court must weigh the two interests
against each other as part of the second prong of the Katz test, which will
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable as to
information held by a third party. Under this framework, the third-party
doctrine will apply as usual when the third party’s autonomy interest
outweighs the individual’s information/autonomy privacy interest. However,
the third-party doctrine will not apply when an individual’s
information/autonomy interest outweighs the third party’s autonomy interest in
sharing information with the government. Thus, when the individual’s interest
prevails, the individual’s expectation of privacy should be deemed reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In the first step of the competing-interests test, the Court should assign a
value to the two competing interests at stake according to three guiding
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principles. The first guiding principle is that, when the third party is reporting
information pursuant to government compulsion—for example, in compliance
with a warrant or subpoena—the third party’s autonomy-privacy interest
should be given little, if any, weight. Under these circumstances, the third
party’s autonomy privacy is nonexistent because she is not exercising any
choice about whether to share information with the government. Instead, the
third party effectively is acting as the government.204 This conclusion has some
important consequences depending on the nature of the government
compulsion. First, if the compulsion is made pursuant to a warrant, then the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied notwithstanding the thirdparty doctrine. Second, in all other circumstances, the third-party doctrine
typically would not apply at all: because the third party’s autonomy interest is
so diminished, it will almost always be outweighed by the individual’s
information/autonomy interest. This conclusion does not mean that
government compulsion short of a warrant is per se unconstitutional, however.
Rather, it means that the third-party doctrine cannot be the basis for its validity
under the Fourth Amendment.
Under the second guiding principle, the third party’s autonomy-privacy
interest generally should weigh less when the third party is an entity as
opposed to when the third party is a human. This principle is based on the
premise that entities need not enjoy constitutional rights to the same extent that
individuals do when they come at the expense of individuals.205 In the context
of behavioral targeting, this means that, because an ad network is an entity, its
autonomy interest carries less weight in the competing-interests calculus than
if it were a person. Accordingly, whether the ad network’s diminished
autonomy interest would prevail in any given situation would depend on the
relative weight given to the individual’s competing information/autonomy
interest. Admittedly, this principle creates a gray area because the outcome
depends on how the Court chooses to value the individual’s
information/autonomy interest. In turn, how the Court chooses to value an
individual’s interest might also depend on how it defines the nature of the
individual’s underlying autonomy interest. Happily, the next principle helps
resolve some of the blurriness in this area.

204 See Henderson, supra note 197, at 992 (“If the third party obtaining the information is effectively law
enforcement, or if that party is obtaining or retaining the information for law enforcement, and it is obtained or
retained solely for a law enforcement purpose, unfettered collection and/or access [should be considered]
unreasonable.”).
205 See discussion supra notes 32–33.
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Under the third—and final—guiding principle, the individual’s
information/autonomy interest should carry the most weight when it involves
an underlying autonomy interest that is otherwise protected by the
Constitution,206 such that, when the third party is an entity, the individual’s
interest should always prevail and the third-party doctrine should never apply.
The same is not true when the third party is a person, however. Even when an
individual’s underlying autonomy interest is constitutionally protected, the
third party’s interest nevertheless should prevail. While this outcome places the
third party’s interest in sharing information with the government above the
individual’s constitutional autonomy interest, to hold otherwise would result in
“denying one person’s full personhood to protect another’s interests,” as
Professor Coombs observes.207 In the case of behavioral targeting, then,
because the Internet user’s information/autonomy privacy arguably implicates
substantive due process or First Amendment rights, the Internet user’s
information/autonomy interest outweighs the autonomy interest of the ad
network, an entity. As a result, information collected by ad networks would be
protected by the Fourth Amendment and inaccessible to the government absent
a warrant. Importantly, however, the result would be different if the ad network
were a person, instead of an entity. Under those circumstances, the ad
network’s autonomy interest would always outweigh the Internet user’s
information/autonomy interest.
The three guiding principles leave one circumstance unaccounted for—the
circumstance in which the third party is an entity, but the individual’s
underlying autonomy interest is not otherwise constitutionally protected. In
this scenario, the Court would still need to assign values to each party’s
interest and weigh them against each other accordingly. How the Court would
value each interest might depend on a variety of other factors, however. As for
a third-party entity, perhaps a partnership might have a stronger autonomy
interest than a publicly traded corporation. As for an individual, perhaps her
autonomy interest should be given greater weight when it reflects an activity
that is essential to everyday life or which is more or less involuntary. As a
general rule, an entity’s autonomy interest should prevail against an

206 Professor Crocker makes a similar, but narrower, argument: “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects not
only privacy, but also liberty. . . . If the [government] intrusion implicates a protected interpersonal
relationship, then the State must follow default Fourth Amendment procedures in order to conduct a valid
search.” Crocker, supra note 175, at 9.
207 Coombs, supra note 196, at 1644.
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individual’s only if it is extremely compelling.208 Concededly, the competinginterests test threatens to become quite complicated and nuanced under this
category. The possibility of complication alone should not defeat the test,
however. While it is possible to imagine any number of factors that would help
courts navigate the nuances of this category, such an exercise exceeds the
scope of this Comment.
Thus, the possible results of applying the guiding principles to the
competing-interests test is illustrated below:

208 Perhaps, for example, an entity’s autonomy interest might prevail when it seeks to share information
about an individual to prevent an imminent national emergency.
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interest)
Third party is an
entity
(diminished
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interest)
Person or entity
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Is the
individual’s
underlying
autonomy
interest
protected under
the Due Process
Clauses or the
First
Amendment?
Yes

Prevailing party

Is the
individual’s
expectation of
privacy
reasonable under
Katz?

Third Party

No

No

Third Party

No

Yes

Individual

Yes

No

Individual or
Third Party,
depending

Yes or No,
depending

N/A

Individual

Yes, if
government
compulsion was
not pursuant to a
warrant or
otherwiseappropriate
individualized
suspicion

C. Applying the New Third-Party Doctrine to Behavioral Targeting
The competing-interests test would resolve the fears surrounding a strict
application of the third-party doctrine to personal information gathered by ad
networks for behavioral targeting. In particular, the test would permit Internet
users to consent to behavioral targeting to access online content for free
without simultaneously relinquishing all Fourth Amendment protections. As a
result, Internet users could enjoy increased online privacy as to both ad
networks and the government. The competing-interests test also takes into
account the reality of today’s increasingly digitized world in which
participation in everyday life requires sharing information. If, in some not-too-
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distant future, every facet of life is recorded by third parties and kept in a
database accessible by the government, the third-party doctrine will allow
modern technology to swallow the Fourth Amendment.209 Behavioral targeting
offers proof that comprehensive, real-time recordation of people’s personal
lives is not only possible but already happening.
Applying the competing-interests test to the case of behavioral targeting is
fairly straightforward. The first step requires the Court to assign a value to
each party’s interest—the individual’s information/autonomy interest, on the
one hand, and the third party’s interest in sharing information with the
government, on the other—taking into account the three guiding principles.
The first principle would not apply to behavioral targeting unless the
government compelled the third party, the ad network, to provide information
pursuant to a law. Assuming no such compulsion exists, the case does not fall
under situation V in the table above. Under the second principle, because the
ad network is an entity, rather than a person, the Court would assign a
diminished value to the ad network’s interest in sharing information with the
government. Therefore, depending on how the Court valued the Internet user’s
information/autonomy interest, the case would fall under situation III or IV.
How the Court would value the Internet user’s information/autonomy
interest would depend on how it defined the user’s underlying autonomy
interest. According to the third principle, if the Court defined the interest as
one protected under substantive due process or the First Amendment, then the
Internet user’s interest would prevail. For example, an Internet user arguably
has a substantive due process right in gathering information about medical
treatment, or perhaps about issues relating to sexuality on the Internet, because
exploring information is critical to, or perhaps represents in itself, an intimate
choice regarding those protected areas.210 The user’s underlying autonomy
interest might also be defined as a broad First Amendment freedom.211 When a
person browses the Internet, she engages in protected First Amendment
activity—she explores and receives ideas, she associates freely, and she may
have a right to anonymity.
If the Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest were found to implicate
either substantive due process or First Amendment autonomy interests, then
209 According to estimates, the volume of the world’s collected data doubles every year. THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 91, at 8.
210 See Solove, supra note 188, at 122.
211 See id. at 121–23.
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under the second prong of the competing-interests test, the Internet user’s
information/autonomy interest would prevail over the ad network’s interest in
sharing information with the government and, therefore, would be subject to
Fourth Amendment protection.212 The result would be the same even if the
Internet user consented to being tracked when, if given the option to join a “Do
Not Track” list, she declined in order to access ad-supported online content. In
other words, the fact that an Internet user consents to being tracked by a third
party does not mean she enjoys a lesser Fourth Amendment privacy interest as
to the government.
On the other hand, the Court might define the Internet user’s underlying
autonomy interest as one that does not implicate some constitutional right. For
example, the Court could view the Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest
as the right to be able to access online content for free. This interest—access to
free online content—likely garners no support from the Court’s substantive
due process or First Amendment jurisprudence. As another example, the Court
could define the autonomy interest as the right to access any given single
webpage (rather than the Internet in its entirety) without government
interference. Similarly, this interest may not trigger constitutional protection
because the amount of interference would be de minimis. Under these narrow
definitions, the case would fall under the gray area of situation IV, and the
individual’s information/autonomy interest would only prevail if the Court
assigned her underlying autonomy interest a higher value (based on
nonconstitutional considerations) than the ad network’s interest in sharing
information with the government.
Though there is no way of knowing how the Court would define the
Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest, the Court’s recent direction in
City of Ontario v. Quon suggests that it would be willing to view the interest as
one that is constitutionally protected.213 To recall, the Court expressed
sensitivity toward the potential privacy implications of new technology that is
“so pervasive” that it is an “essential means or necessary instrument[] for selfexpression, even self-identification.”214 The Internet is not only a pervasive
fixture in everyday life; it is also a permanent and essential one. Tied up in the
Internet’s role is behavioral targeting, and tied up in behavioral targeting is,
quite literally, information reflecting self-expression and self-identification.

212
213
214

The case would fall under situation III in the table.
See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
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Ultimately, if the government’s unfettered access to this information were
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, then the Court’s language in Quon
would be stripped of its meaning. At least in light of Quon, it seems that the
Internet user’s underlying autonomy interest would be constitutionally
protected, thus triggering Fourth Amendment protection under the competinginterests test.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brandeis once described the right to privacy—what he termed “the
right to be let alone”—as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”215 Fearing that “[w]ays may some day be developed
by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
[could] reproduce them in court . . . to expose . . . the most intimate
occurrences of the home,”216 the Justice urged a reading of the Fourth
Amendment that would allow for adaptation in a world of technological
change: “Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing
world. . . . ‘[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been but of what may be.’”217 Justice Brandeis’s words
resonate even more ominously with the advance of behavioral targeting. Never
before have third parties held so much personal information about so many
people—a reality likely irreversible given the central and permanent role the
Internet plays in everyday life. Indeed, “[a]s a means of espionage, writs of
assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression” by comparison.218 In light of these technological developments, it
is imperative that the Supreme Court reevaluate its third-party doctrine.
This Comment has argued that the Court could limit the third-party
doctrine by adopting a new analytical framework called the competinginterests test. The competing-interests test would require the Court to broaden
its conception of Fourth Amendment privacy while acknowledging that the
third-party doctrine is justified as a safeguard of third-party autonomy interests
in sharing information with the government. Importantly, instead of
categorically barring Fourth Amendment protection for any information an
215 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
216 Id. at 474.
217 Id. at 472, 474 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
218 Id. at 476.
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individual volunteers to a third party, the competing-interests test would
safeguard an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy when that interest is
most compelling. Accordingly, the competing-interests test contemplates not
only what has been but also what may be, so to better secure “the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”—the right
to privacy.
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